Norayr Eblighatian
The following is my viewpoint on the Azeri moves that resulted in a checkmate.
1. Aerial Supremacy:
Azerbaijan started neutralizing the Armenian air force as early as 2014 (the downing of the Armenian military helicopter inside the Armenian border).
Turkey also shot down an Armenian SU-25, after 3 days of the start of hostilities (Sept. 29, 2020) again inside the Armenian territory, making the small & traditional air force completely ineffective.
Azerbaijan introduced IAI Harop loitering drones in the war of 2016. Armenians did not have an effective countermeasure. They used “rifles against drones” (a Vietnam era tactic against the American air force) (please see the archives).
While it is true that the Armenians started buying drones themselves, their numbers and value were completely neutralized by:
– The abundance of Turkish drones of different sizes and roles.
– The knowledge transfer that Turkish technicians conveyed to the Azeris.
By September 2020, aerial supremacy was undoubted with the Azeri forces.
In addition to UAVs, there were also other technologies that tilted the balance: Terrain following radar, jamming systems, smart micro-munition missiles, Bayraktar tb2 UAVs plus Turkish military advisors helped in consolidating the Azeri ascendency.
The irony in all these is that the Turks were honing these systems/tactics against Russian-backed forces in Syria & Libya, and the Russians were working on countermeasures.
The Armenians were in a dormant state, relying instead on “Haghtelu enk” slogans.
2. Smashing the Front Defense Line:
The next item on the Azeri check-mark list was the smashing of the front defense line. The first of a one-two-punch check-mark.
This was first accomplished by using thermobaric weapons (TOS 1A) on April 4, 2016, on the Armenian defense front line. These weapons and tactics were improved for maximum efficiency to be used on September 28, 2020.
Again, these weapons and tactics were being fine-tuned by the Turks in Syria & Libya with the Russians working on catching up with countermeasures.
Armenians have a wide-spread diasporan community in Syria, but because of poor communications between the government of Armenia and the community in Syria, this vital information did not trickle back to Armenia.
3. Obliterating the main defense forces:
The second of the one-two-punch is the destruction of the main defense force which is the situation behind the border.
During the 2016 war, the main defense forces were not activated because of the bravery/sacrifice of the front line.
However, in September of 2020, the main defense forces were moved to help the front line and thus were exposed to UAV and artillery precision strikes. The modern, perfected version of the ‘search and destroy’ strategy.
We finally come to the Achilles heel of the Armenian defense forces. Modern forces (defense and offense) have to be integrated with systems of Aerial layered umbrella defenses. These aerial layers (short, intermediate, and long-range) have the role of shielding the infantry, heavy armor, and aerial assets from enemy attack.
The Russian forces that landed in Artsakh brought with them these aerial shields which were tested and fine-tuned in Syria.
Incidentally, it is amazing how fast the Russians arrived when part of Artsakh has seceded to them (rapid deployment of forces).
4. Diversionary tactics:
There were some diversionary tactics and I would like to mention two:
* Confrontation across the whole borderline. This was to conceal the real thrust of the Azeri campaign, but it took time for the Armenian side to realize it meanwhile valuable time and resources were lost.
Initially, it was thought that a major southern incursion in the lowlands can be countered by a counterattack that can close the bulge and isolate the Azeri attacking forces into two. However, the surprise was that the incursion veered north and went all the way to Shushi. The border defense forces had left the interior of Artsakh undefended. No defense in layers (the traditional Russian strategy that succeeded against the German blitzkrieg).
This failure of intelligence was decisive for the outcome of the war.
* Jihadi forces introduction. The Jihadi forces were never meant to liberate Azeri land. That was a task/duty of the Azeri forces. The Jihadi forces were diversionary fodder for Armenian artillery, which when activated was also located and destroyed.
5. Ceasefire after defeat:
There is a lot of dialogue that the Armenian PM should not have signed the ceasefire/capitulation document.
That is a lot of academic talks; because anyone who has visited Shushi or has read about the 1990s war knows that after securing the Shushi heights, Stepanakert could not have been saved from even small/medium artillery. Without air support and the road to Stepanakert being blocked (it runs by Shushi), the people in Stepanakert were sitting ducks.
President J F Kennedy said after the Bay of Pigs: “Victory has 100 fathers, while defeat is an orphan”.
6. Aftermath & finger-pointing:
So, what now?
There have been other defeats in history.
The Turks signed the Armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918, after their defeat of World War One. After the Turkish war of independence, the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed on October 29, 1923 (in a mere five years).
The Azeris lost the first war of Artsakh on May 12, 1994. It took them till September 2020 to regain some of their lost territories in November 2020.
What will the Armenians do?
To conclude, let’s ask the same question we started with: was the War of 2020 a Perfect Storm or a Checkmate?
It seems that it is both; like a Venn diagram with 2 superimposed circles with a large intersection part.
My 2 cents – In War: Resolution; In Defeat: Defiance; In Victory: Magnanimity; In Peace: Goodwill. See Less